This paper addresses the problem of identi cation of theater ballistic missiles during boost phase using radar measurements. Based on the use of the Wald sequential probability ratio test (SPRT), three identi cation algorithms are presented, corresponding to scenarios of increasing uncertainty. The use of the SPRT allows meeting speci ed false-alarm and missed-detection probabilities, while minimizing identi cation time. When the missiles' dynamic models and launch initial conditions (location and time) are completely and accurately known, the SPRT works directly with the raw radar measurements. In other scenarios, including a case where the launch location and launch time are unknown, two extended Kalman lters are used to generate the innovations sequences driving the SPRT. An extensive Monte Carlo simulation study is used to demonstrate the performance of the proposed procedures. Although the identi cation times and actual error probabilities depend, to some degree, on proper lter tuning, it is shown that reasonable mean identi cation times can be attained, corresponding to acceptable false-alarm and missed-detection rates, even in the presence of model uncertainties. This performance renders the proposed algorithms viable for the dif cult problem considered.
I. Introduction I
T is widely recognized these days that theater ballistic missiles (TBM) impose a severe threat, which needs to be fully addressed on various levels.This paper is concernedwith the operationallevel, where several ballistic-missile-defense (BMD) systems, belonging to competing concepts, have been proposed over the last decade. Some of these systems, such as the PAC-3 and the Arrow, have already demonstratedtheir ability to interceptnonmaneuveringTBMs with a hit-to-kill accuracy in controlled experiments 1;2 and have been declared operational.
Currently known TBMs are not designed to maneuver. Nevertheless, they have an inherent high maneuvering potential in the atmosphere, resulting from their very high reentry speed. The successful development of BMD systems, such as the PAC-3 and the Arrow, is expected to motivate the development of a new generation of maneuveringTBMs in the foreseeablefuture. Although a TBM is blind with respect to the interceptor, it can execute hard maneuvers randomly in order to avoid interception on its way to a designated surface target, while complying with the constraint of hitting it. A defense system that cannot guarantee that the miss distance generated by a target evasive maneuver will be suf ciently small will render the probability of an unacceptable leakage nonzero.
The TBM's trajectory can be divided into three phases: boost phase, midcourse, and the terminal phase. During the boost phase, the engine is operating and so is the guidance system. In the midcourse phase, which occurs mainly in space, the trajectory is essentially ballistic. In the terminal phase the ballistic missile reenters the atmosphere. It can be argued that the interception of a ballistic missile during its boost phase is superior to its interceptionin subsequent phases (which has been the underlyingprincipleof BMD sys-tems such as PAC-3 and Arrow). This is so because during the boost phase the ballistic missile is a huge, distinct, and especially vulnerable target, in contrast with the following phases during which hitting the target 1) is very dif cult (and, hence, has been termed "shooting a bullet with a bullet" in the missile community) and 2) might not be suf cient for guaranteeing the required defense. During the midcourse phase, the missile's engine is off; hence, the TBM is more dif cult to detect. In addition, the missile is in space, and the warhead can easily break up into many parts, including munitions and debris, which are hard to hit. The missile's dynamic behavior during boost phase is quite predictable and essentially nonmaneuvering. On the other hand, when the ballistic missile reenters the atmosphere it is extremely fast, maneuverable, and, consequently, very hard to intercept. 3 Moreover, as was demonstrated during the 1991 Gulf War, some ballistic missiles are not structurally well designed; hence, they tend to break up during their reentry and become unstable, rendering them dif cult to intercept. Finally, boost-phase intercept (BPI) has the distinct strategic advantage of inducing a threat to the enemy because of the risk of explosion above enemy territory.
A feasible BPI defense system can be based on aerial platformsmanned aircraft or unmanned vehicles-equipped with search-andtrack systems and armed with air-to-air missiles. The aerial platforms loiter above the enemy territory, detect the TBM, and launch the intercepting missiles to hit or divert the threat. 4 One of the most dif cult challenges facing such a defense system is the fact that the boost-phase duration is relatively very short. The purpose of the search-and-track system of the platform is to identify the launched TBM within a short time interval, which lasts from the time the TBM is detected until a reasonable time prior to the end of the boost phase. This information, along with the target data and its current and future positions, is transmitted to the interceptor, enabling it to plan the required interception.
This paper is concerned with the problem of identifying the type of the TBM within the boost phase. Such a capability in this early stage of the ight is essentialfor planningthe interceptor's trajectory and for determining the performance envelope of the entire system. The earlier is the TBM identi cation, the higher is the BPI success probability.Moreover, an early identi cation capability enables the reduction of the required interceptor velocity and maneuverability, or, alternatively,the enlargement of the platform's deployment area. In addition, such a system can operate as a warning system for the defended assets. The identi cation methods presented herein are based on Wald's sequential probability ratio test (SPRT). 5 Characterized by its ability to reach a decision between two hypotheses using a minimal set of measurements while satisfying prespeci ed error probability constraints, the SPRT facilitates the identi cation of the launched TBM in minimal time, which, in turn, is essential for the success of the BPI system.
The boost-phase missile identi cation problem, dealt with here, can be viewed as a member of the broad class of problems of identi cation and classi cation of objects. For obvious reasons, this class of problems is of paramount importance in many applications. Automatic-target-recognition (ATR) systems aim at solving such problems via fusing information from an array of sensors, including electro-optical,infrared,radar, and other sensors. ATR systems deal with the identi cation of targets in the presence of clutter and with their classi cation, as well as with making the distinction between similar types of targets. A review of ATR systems is presented in Ref. 6 . Bhanu 7 discusses the application of neural networks technology to ATR problems. The optimum character of the SPRT has rendered it a useful tool for ATR systems, and Jouny and Garber 8 present extensions of the SPRT to cases where the ATR system has to distinguish between more than two targets (simple hypotheses).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section the mathematical model of the TBM identi cation problem is de ned. Three identi cation algorithms are then presented,correspondingto three differentscenariosorderedaccordingto increasing uncertainty. Results of an extensive Monte Carlo simulation study are then presented,which demonstratethe capabilityof the proposed algorithms. Concluding remarks are offered in the last section.
II. Problem Formulation
This paper is concerned with a scenario where two TBMs are presentin the theater. Denote these missiles by TBM-A and TBM-B. The BPI aerial platform is a single unmanned vehicle, carrying a radar system that measuresthe range and the two line-of-sight(LOS) angles to the target. A typical scenario geometry is shown in Fig. 1 . The search-and-tracksystem uses the radar measurements to drive an estimator and a statistical test in order to identify the type of the launched missile. This scenario can form a basis for more complicated scenarios, such as when more than two types of TBMs are suspected, when a number of launchers are active or when a number of defending platforms are ying.
A. Target Model
The TBM's state vector is de ned as
where x, y, and z are the TBM horizontal, sideways, and vertical coordinates, respectively, in an inertial system xed to the launch location,V is the velocity,°is the ight-pathangle, Â is the azimuth launch angle, and a n is the normal acceleration. Typically,the durationof the estimation and identi cationprocess is very short (on the order of about 30 s). Hence, to simplify the ensuing analysis without losing generality it is assumed that the angle Â is constant throughout the estimation process and that the Earth is at and nonrotating.In addition, it is assumed that the actual normal acceleration a n obeys rst-order dynamics with time constant ¿ , the TBM ies at zero sideslip angle, and the TBM's thrust is directed along the ight trajectory. The TBM equations of motion thus become
where a C n is the normal acceleration command, T and D are the enginethrustandaerodynamicdrag, respectively,and g is the gravity acceleration.The normal accelerationcommand is active between t 1 and t 2 (measured from launch time) in order to achieve the required range with a predetermined cutoff time.
B. Measurement Model
Carried by the aerial platform, the radar system measures the slant range and the two LOS angles to the target. The measurement equation is
The radar measurement vector is given by
where Ã k and µ k are the azimuth and elevationLOS angles at time t k , respectively, and r k is the range to the TBM at time
T denote the positions at time t k of the aerial platform, which carries the radar system, and the TBM, respectively. Without loss of generality, it is assumed in this work that the radar's position is known and constant. This assumption is justi ed by noting that the duration of the decision process is very short and that the radar-carryingplatform measures its own position with great accuracy (e.g., using an inertial navigation system and/or global positioning system).
The measurement noise v k is modeled as a zero-mean, white, Gaussian sequence with known covariance, that is,
where
III. Identi cation Algorithms
The TBM identi cation algorithms are based on the use of a statistical test for reaching a decision between the following null and alternate hypotheses, respectively:
To minimize the identi cation time, the statistical test used in this work is Wald's SPRT. 5;9 Devised in 1943 by Wald as the rst solution of the general problem of sequential tests of statistical hypotheses, the SPRT is commonly applied in various elds such as failure detection and isolation, 10 radar target detection, 11;12 and automatic target recognition. 8 The SPRT considers the decision time as a random variable and aims at reaching a decision between the hypotheses in minimum time, while complying with the constraints of false-alarm and missed-detection probabilities as set by the designer. Conjectured by Wald in 1943, this optimum nature of the SPRT was proved in 1948 in a joint work with Wolfowitz. 13 Remark 1: The problem addressed in this paper deals with the identi cation of two ballistic missiles. Nevertheless,complex cases dealing with more than two missiles can also be handled using similar principles. Thus, Ref. 8 treats the extension of the SPRT to more than two hypotheses in order to identify an aircraft target out of M > 2 possible targets, using radar measurements.
The SPRT is de ned as follows. Observe the joint likelihoodratio, or equivalentlythe logarithm of the joint likelihoodratio 3 n , de ned as
where p.Z n jH i / is the the probabilitydensity function (PDF) of the measurements given the hypothesis
A function of the observation sequence Z n , the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) 3 n is calculated sequentially. The LLR value is then tested against two thresholds, A > 0 and B < 0, derived from the predeterminedfalse-alarmand missed-detectionprobabilities® and , respectively, according to
where ® and¯are de ned by
and 0 0 and 0 1 are the two disjoint subspaces, corresponding to the two hypotheses, composing the observation space 0. The partition of the observationspace 0 into 0 0 and 0 1 is such that the hypothesis H 0 is accepted if the observations belong to 0 0 and H 1 is accepted if the observations are from 0 1 . The SPRT, which is designed to minimize the number of measurements required to make a decision while satisfying the speci ed error probabilities ® and¯, is de ned as follows:
When either of the thresholds is reached, a corresponding decision is made. Until such occurrence,the decision is postponedto the next observation sample. Remark 2: Wald's SPRT assumes a static hypothesis structure, that is, one of the two given hypothesesis true and the other is false throughout the estimation process. A modi ed SPRT was proposed by Shiryayev, 14 in which a switch between the two hypothesesis allowed during the process. This property makes the modi ed SPRT suitable for fault detection and isolation applications, 15 where a certain component can function properly at the beginning of the process and then malfunction at a later stage (corresponding to a failure, which can be described as a switch from H 0 to H 1 ). In the case under considerationherein, the simpler Wald's SPRT is appropriate because no switch between the hypotheses (correspondingto the different missiles) is allowed.
The analysis presented in the sequel addresses three possible scenarios, corresponding to three levels of increasing uncertainty.
A. Complete Information
Assume that the launch location and launch time, as well as the launch azimuth angle and the TBM model, are accurately known. In most cases, this assumption would be unrealistic. Nevertheless,this case was analyzed in this work in order to provide a performance bound for the more realistic cases to be addressed in the sequel.
Because the radar measurement noise is white, the raw measurements in this case are statistically independent. Thus, the joint PDF of the measurement sequence given each hypothesis can be computed as the product of the marginal PDFs of all individual measurements in the sequence
The LLR is given, in this case, by
Notice that the LLR is given here as a function of the sample size, which is a random variable. To calculate the LLR, the PDF of each measurement in the observationsequence needs to be calculated for each of the two hypotheses. To that end, notice that if TBM-A was launched (corresponding to the null hypothesis) the measurement equation is given by
where x A k is the state vector corresponding to TBM-A, that is, the measurement sequence in this case is white, Gaussian, with mean and covariance
To formulate the measurement equation in case TBM-B was launched, assume that an additive, time-varying bias distinguishes between the two missiles' state vectors, that is,
This facilitates writing the expression for the measurement corresponding to TBM-B as a function of TBM-A's state
In practice, it is known that the differences between the trajectories of similar theater ballistic missiles (e.g., SCUD-B and SCUD-C) during the boost phase are minor, as shown in Fig. 2 . Therefore, Eq. (17) can be approximated using a rst-order Taylor expansion as
where the matrix r x h T denotes the gradient of the measurement vector. Thus, given a TBM-B launch (correspondingto the alternate hypothesis) the measurement equation is given by The PDFs of the measurement samples given the two hypotheses are, thus, given by
and
The LLR for the kth measurement is given by
Thus the LLR for n statisticallyindependentmeasurements is given by
B. Staring Radar
In this scenario the assumptions of known launch location and launch azimuth angle are relaxed. It is still assumed that the launch time is known. This is a typical case for a radar staring at the target area, which is capable of accurately observing the launch time without being able to pinpoint the speci c location of the launch. Here the measurements are statistically dependent as a result of initial condition uncertainty, and, therefore,
To use the SPRT in this case, the joint PDF of the measurement history is written in terms of the conditional PDF product
where p.
To compute the conditional PDF product on the right-hand side of Eq. (26), we use the innovations process de ned as
where the predicted measurement is
Computed internally by the Kalman lter, the innovations process is zero mean, white, Gaussian distributed with
where H k is the measurement matrix (the Jacobian of the nonlinear measurement function) and P kjk ¡ 1 is the covariance matrix of the prediction error. The conditional PDF of the kth measurement sample given all previous measurements is given by
Using Eqs. (27) and (28) in Eq. (30) yields
where covfz k jZ k ¡ 1 g is the covariance of the innovations process
Therefore,the conditionalPDF of the measurementcan be computed via the PDF of the innovations process
which expresses the known fact that the measurement and innovations processes are causally invertible. 16 Because the innovations process is Gaussian and white,
Using the last result, the LLR can be computed as
To compute the PDFs of the innovations appearing in Eq. (35), two extended Kalman lters (EKFs) are used, corresponding to the two hypotheses.Denote the EKF correspondingto the null hypothesis (TBM-A) by EKF-0 and the EKF correspondingto the alternate hypothesis (TBM-B) by EKF-1. The EKFs utilize the TBM differential equations (2), where the acceleration pro les are derived by propagating Eq. (2g) for nominal values of the acceleration commands and time constants.
De ne the state vector of both EKFs as
The state variables satisfy the following differential equations: where w st D [w x ; w y ; w z ; w v ; w°; w Â ] T is a white, Gaussian noise process with
The noise intensity matrix Q st .t / is used to tune the EKF in cases where model parameter uncertaintyis considered.It is assumed that the initial state is Gaussian distributed with
The LLR for the kth measurement sample is given by
where the indices 0 and 1 indicate that the associated variables are computed using EKF-0 and EKF-1, respectively. The SPRT is implemented by testing the LLR
against the two thresholds computed previously, as detailed in Eq. (11).
C. Search Radar
In this scenario a search radar is considered, which acquires the target without having speci c knowledge about its launch location and launch time. Thus, in addition to other variables already estimated, in this case the launch time needs to be estimated as well. To this end, the launch time needs to be explicitlyintroducedinto the mathematical model. This is done by rst calculating the nominal ight-path angle for each TBM using Eqs. (2e) and (2g). Then, the differentialequationof the ight-path angle [Eq. (2e)] is replacedby a polynomial expressing the ight-path angle as a function of two time variables: 1) t 0 , the duration from the unknown launch time until the target acquisition by the radar, and 2) t, the running time from acquisition to identi cation.
De ne the state vector of both EKFs in this case as The state variables satisfy the following differential equations:
where w sr D [w x ; w y ; w z ; w v ; w Â ; w t0 ] T is a white, Gaussian noise process with
The noise intensity matrix Q sr .t / is used to tune the EKF in cases where model parameter uncertaintyis considered.It is assumed that the initial state is Gaussian distributed with
The TBM's ight-path angle and mass variation with time are given by the following polynomials:°.
The ight-path angle's polynomial coef cients and the trajectory segment end times t 3 and t 4 were chosen to best t (in a least-squares sense) the nominal curves. The engine cutoff time is t co . The TBM's mass m also varies as a function of t 0 and t . 
IV. Simulation Study
A numerical simulation study was carried out in order to demonstrate the performance of the proposed TBM identi cation method. The TBMs assumed in this study are SCUD-C, correspondingto the null hypothesisH 0 , and SCUD-B, correspondingto the alternatehypothesis H 1 . The model parameters of both missiles were estimated based on data appearing in Ref. 17 . These parameters are summarized in Table 1 . In the scenario analyzed one TBM launcher is located at the origin of the referenceframe (see Fig. 1 ). The radar coordinates in the reference frame are [x r ; y r ; z r ] D [100; 10; 10] km. Figure 2 shows the boost-phasetrajectoriesof both missiles under consideration. As can be clearly observed, the boost trajectories of both missiles are very similar, which renders the identi cation problem rather dif cult.
The measurements are sampled at a frequency of 10 Hz and are contaminated by an additive zero-mean Gaussian noise with standard deviations of
The false-alarm and missed-detection probabilities are set to be
with corresponding threshold values
The three cases analyzed in the preceding section are considered in the sequel. 
A. Simulation Results

Complete Information
In this case the launch location and launch time are assumed known. Figure 3 demonstrates the performance of the SPRT for both TBMs in a typical case. It can be observed that a SCUD-C launch is identi ed at about 7.5 s, whereas a SCUD-B launch is identi ed at about 9 s. Figure 4 shows the performance of the SPRT as a function of the measurement noise intensity.As could be expected, higher measurement noise results in delayed identi cation. Figure 5 presents a statistical analysis of the performance of the SPRT, as observed using Monte Carlo simulations with the measurement noise model of Eq. (52). The upper plot shows the identication time histogram correspondingto 10,000 SCUD-C launches (corresponding to the H 0 hypothesis). The observed false-alarm rate is 0.0081, and the mean identi cation time is 8.54 s. The lower plot shows the corresponding result in the case of 10,000 SCUD-B launches (corresponding to the H 1 hypothesis). In this case the observed missed-detection rate is 0.0072, and the mean identi cation time is 8.53 s. In both cases the observed error rates do not exceed the predetermined error probabilities.
As already mentioned, this unrealistic case of complete information serves to obtain bounds on the attainable performance of the proposed algorithms in more realistic cases. These cases are presented next.
Staring Radar
In this case the launch time is assumed known, while the launch location is assumed unknown. The statistical moments of the initial state vector are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 . The process noise intensity used in this case is Q st .t / D 0. Figure 6 shows the TBM position estimation errors as generated by the two EKFs associated with the SPRT. In both cases the missile launched is SCUD-C. As evident from Fig. 6 , EKF-0 (designed about the H 0 hypothesis) performs well, contrary to EKF-1 (designed about the H 1 hypothesis). These results correlate well with the divergence of the innovations process computed by EKF-1, as shown in Fig. 7 for the three measurement components,Ã , µ , and r. The last result bears a special signi cance because the implementation of the SPRT in this case is based on the innovations process as computed by the two lters.
Search Radar
In this case the launch location and the launch azimuth angle are unknown, as in the earlier case. The time from launch until target acquisition t 0 is assumed to be uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 3] s. The statistical moments of the initial state vector are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 . The process noise intensity used in this case is Q st .t / D 0. Figure 8 shows the estimation performance of EKF-0 in a typical case, wherethe missile launchedis SCUD-C. In this particularexample, the TBM was launched 3 s before acquisition,while the estimator assumed initially that t 0 D 0 s. Excellent estimation performance is demonstratedfor all estimatedstate variables,includingthe launch time. On the other hand, Fig. 9 shows the performance of EKF-1 in the same case. Because this lter's model (assuming SCUD-B) does not match the true system's state (correspondingto SCUD-C), this lter divergesin almost all state variables, as could be expected.
B. Monte Carlo Simulation Results
To statistically assess the performance of the method, a 600-run Monte Carlo simulation study (300 runs for each TBM) was conducted in both the staring radar and the search radar cases. In each of these cases, the associated unknown TBM launch parameters (launch location, azimuth angle and time) were randomly sampled from their assumed respective distributions. 
Nominal Performance
The rst phase of the simulation assumed nominal parameters for the TBM's mathematicalmodel (i.e., no parameteruncertainty). The resulting mean identi cation times and the observed error rates are shown in Table 4 . In both cases, the observed error rates differ from their corresponding predetermined values. This can be explained by noting that the SPRT is driven by the innovations process as computed by the EKF; thus, the identi cation time and the error a) x, y, z b) v, Â, t 0 Fig. 8 EKF-0 estimation performance for a SCUD-C launch; search radar: --, estimation error; , 1-¾ envelope (as computed by the lter). rates depend, to some extent, on proper lter tuning. Also, as could be expected, the identi cation times have almost doubled relative to the complete information case. The identi cation times for the search radar case, where the launch time is unknown, are not signi cantly different than those for the staring radar case, where the launch time is assumed known. This can be attributed to the high accuracy of the state estimators used and, in particular, to the accurate estimation of the launch time.
Performance in the Presence of Parameter Uncertainty
In the second phase of the Monte Carlo simulation, some uncertainty was assumed in the TBM's mathematical model main parameters. This case was run to analyze the sensitivity of the proposed identi cation algorithms to variations in the underlying mathematical model. When missile parameter uncertaintiesare considered,the identi cation problem becomes more dif cult because the feasible missile trajectory envelopes become very similar. Thus, it becomes more dif cult to statistically distinguish between the missiles, and it can be expected that the mean identi cation times will be longer (because more measurements are required to reach a statistically signi cant decision in the presence of uncertainty).
Variationsin the followingparameterswere assumed:initialmass, mass reduction rate, drag coef cient, and TBM acceleration command. Monte Carlo simulation runs were performed where these Table 5 .
To enable the EKF to deal with parameter uncertainties,its bandwidth was increased. This was done by using the process noise intensity matrix given in Table 6 .
Monte Carlo simulations of 300 launches for each TBM resulted in the mean identi cation times and observed false-alarmand missed-detectionrates as shown in Table 7 . As could be expected,the mean identi cation times in the presence of parameter uncertainty are longer, and the error rates are increased relative to the nominal case. Nevertheless, the overall performance of the method is still acceptable in both staring and search radar cases, with relatively small error rates (albeit larger than the predetermined thresholds) even in the presence of modeling errors.
V. Conclusions
The problem of deciding between two theater ballistic missiles in an uncertain environment using a minimal number of radar measurements was addressed. Decision algorithms based on Wald's SPRT were developed for several scenarios of increasing complexity. When the missiles' models, as well as their launch location and time, are completely known, the SPRT works directly with the raw measurements. In more practical scenarios, when some of the launch parameters are unknown, the identi cation algorithms use the innovations processes, computed by extended Kalman lters, to drive the SPRT. A Monte Carlo simulation study was used to demonstrate the performance of the proposed algorithms. When the launch parameters are completely known, the observed false-alarm and missed-detection rates are identical to the prespeci ed probability values. In more practical cases, where the launch parameters are partially or completely unknown, the identi cation times and the observed error rates depend on proper lter tuning, as could be expected. Nevertheless, the simulation study demonstrates the method's viability and robustness, with mean identi cation times of about 20 s, correspondingto error rates of a few percent, even in the presence of considerable missile parameter uncertainty.
As a nal note, it should be emphasized that although this paper has addressedthe problemof distinguishingbetween just two theatre ballistic missiles, more complex problems, involving more than two missiles, can be handled similarly using extensions of the methods presented herein. Such extensions can be based on M-ary SPRT techniques that have been introduced in the literature.
